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Abstract
Standard game theory cannot explain the selection of payoff-dominant outcomes that are best for all players in common-
interest games. Theories of team reasoning can explain why such mutualistic cooperation is rational. They propose that 
teams can be agents and that individuals in teams can adopt a distinctive mode of reasoning that enables them to do their 
part in achieving Pareto-dominant outcomes. We show that it can be rational to play payoff-dominant outcomes, given that 
an agent group identifies. We compare team reasoning to other theories that have been proposed to explain how people can 
achieve payoff-dominant outcomes, especially with respect to rationality. Some authors have hoped that it would be possible 
to develop an argument that it is rational to group identify. We identify some large—probably insuperable—problems with 
this project and sketch some more promising approaches, whereby the normativity of group identification rests on morality.
Keywords Collective rationality · Common knowledge · Cooperation · Common interest game · Coordination · Group 
identification · Hi-Lo game · Payoff dominance · Prisoner’s dilemma · Stag Hunt game · Team reasoning
1 Introduction
Game theory is used to explain people’s choices, it both 
predicts behaviour in strategic situations and provides nor-
mative standards for rational play. However, it fails com-
pletely in certain elementary cases. It is unable to explain 
strategic coordination and forms of collective rationality 
that are familiar features of human strategic interaction. In 
particular, standard game theory seems powerless to explain 
the phenomenon where people choose payoff-dominant 
outcomes in games. An outcome is payoff dominant if all 
players receive a higher payoff than in any other outcome. 
Nash equilibrium is the central solution concept for non-
cooperative game theory and all that it can predict in a game 
with multiple equilibria is that one of the equilibria should 
be chosen. If there are outcomes that are Nash equilibria but 
not payoff dominant, then game theory cannot explain why 
the payoff-dominant outcome would be played. Further, an 
outcome is Pareto-dominated if there is another outcome that 
makes at least one player better off and where no players are 
worse off. The Nash Equilibrium of a game may be Pareto-
dominated by another outcome, but if that outcome is not a 
Nash equilibrium, then game theory actually predicts that it 
will not be played.
There is a vast literature on cooperation, most of it 
focused on the Prisoner’s Dilemma, where unilateral defec-
tion yields a higher payoff than joint cooperation, so the 
Nash equilibrium is Pareto-dominated. An interesting and 
arguably more basic problem is how players coordinate on 
mutually beneficial equilibria in common interest games, 
where there is a unique outcome whose payoffs strictly 
Pareto dominate all other outcomes in the game (Aumann 
and Sorin 1989). Coordination on the payoff-dominant 
outcome is clearly a form of cooperation. In Thomas et al. 
(2014), it is called mutualistic cooperation because all the 
individuals involved in the interaction benefit immediately, 
as opposed to the altruistic cooperation found in games like 
the prisoner’s dilemma, where cooperation brings benefits to 
others but at an individual cost. Intuitively, it seems obvious 
that mutualistic cooperation to achieve the Pareto dominant 
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outcome should be the rational choice in common interest 
games. However, a principle of rational mutualistic coop-
eration cannot be derived from the assumptions of standard 
game theory.
In experimental games and in real life, people often 
choose payoff-dominant outcomes. If we are prepared to 
relax the standard assumption of perfect rationality, that 
players maximize their utilities given their beliefs, which 
are correct in equilibrium, or the assumption that the players 
have common knowledge of each other’s rationality, then 
it is not particularly difficult to construct theories that can 
explain the choice of payoff-dominant outcomes. However, 
there are simple coordination games where it seems obvious 
that players should achieve the payoff-dominant outcomes. 
It seems strange that we can explain these only by relaxing 
the assumptions of rationality.
We show how team reasoning, a generalization of game 
theory with the standard theory as a special case, can explain 
rational coordination on Pareto-dominant outcomes. Team 
reasoning applies game theory more widely—it allows that 
groups can be agents—but it leaves the rationality assump-
tions of the standard theory intact. We compare the rational-
ity of team reasoning to that of other theories that purport 
to explain mutualistic cooperation and we explore the type 
of argument that would be needed to recommend group 
identification.
2  Payoff Dominance in Common Interest 
Games
In their work on equilibrium selection in noncooperative 
games, Harsanyi and Selten (1988, pp. 80–90, 355–359) 
discussed payoff dominance at length, especially in relation 
to Aumann’s (1987, p. 3) version of the Stag Hunt game, 
shown on the left in Fig. 1. The game is named after a hypo-
thetical strategic interaction suggested by Rousseau (1755, 
Part 2, paragraph 9) during a discussion of the early devel-
opment of civil society. Rousseau imagined hunters who 
need to coordinate their actions (to choose C) to catch a 
stag, an endeavour that requires working together, but each 
is tempted to defect from the joint enterprise (to choose D) 
and go after a hare, a smaller prize that each could catch 
without the other’s help. In Aumann’s version of the game, 
the payoff for joint defection (7) is slightly less than the 
payoff for unilateral defection (8)—we might imagine that 
a hunter is slightly less likely to catch a hare if both try the 
defecting strategy simultaneously, perhaps because both may 
chase after the same hare—but that in turn is less than the 
payoff for joint cooperation (9); and unilateral cooperation 
yields nothing (0).
On the right of Fig. 1 is a template commonly used to 
define any symmetric 2 × 2 game, according to which 
Aumann’s Stag Hunt game (1987, p. 3, 1990) is defined by 
the inequalities R > T > P > S. The version originally intro-
duced into game theory and named by Lewis (1969, p. 7) 
implied the payoff structure R > T = P > S, but the strate-
gic properties of Aumann’s and Lewis’s versions are very 
similar.
In the Stag Hunt game (Fig. 1), the outcome (C, C) is 
strictly payoff dominant. It is also a Nash equilibrium by 
virtue of the fact that the C strategies are best replies to 
each other. Neither player could get a better payoff by choos-
ing differently against a co-player’s choice of C—against a 
C-chooser, a player receives 9 by choosing C but only 8 by 
choosing D—and it follows that neither player has a reason 
to regret choosing C if the co-player chooses it too. In any 
game, if there is a uniquely rational profile of strategies (one 
for each player), this must necessarily be a Nash equilibrium. 
To see why this is so, we can draw on an important indirect 
argument set out by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944, 
Sect. 17.3.3, p. 148).1 The assumption of common knowl-
edge of rationality implies that, in any uniquely rational 
strategy profile, each player will be able to anticipate the 
co-player’s strategy; but if the strategy profile is not a Nash 
equilibrium, then at least one player is choosing a strategy 
that is not a best reply, violating the rationality assumption; 
therefore the strategy profile must be a Nash equilibrium.
In Aumann’s Stag Hunt game (Fig. 1) a complication 
arises from the fact that the outcome (D, D) is also a Nash 
equilibrium—against a D-chooser, a player receives 7 by 
choosing D but zero by choosing C. The asymmetric (C, D) 
and (D, C) outcomes are not Nash equilibria. It is tempting 
to think that rational players, who by definition seek to maxi-
mize their own payoffs, will coordinate by choosing C in this 
game, because the (C, C) equilibrium is better for both than 
the (D, D) equilibrium. However, remarkably, the fact that 
(C, C) is (strongly) payoff-dominant does not provide the 
players with a sufficient reason, derivable from the standard 
assumptions, to choose their C strategies. The problem is 
that C is not an unconditionally best choice: it is best only 
if the co-player chooses C. In fact, against a D-chooser, the 
  Player 2 
  C D 
Player 1 
C 9, 9 0, 8
D 8, 0 7, 7
Player 2 
C D 
R, R S, T
T, S P, P
Fig. 1  Left: Aumann’s Stag Hunt game, with R > T > P > S. Right: 
generalized template for symmetric 2 × 2 games
1 This argument pre-dates Nash’s (1951) presentation of his equilib-
rium concept for non-cooperative games and was intended as a gen-
eral principal for identifying rational solutions of zero-sum games.
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best reply is clearly D and not C. In other words, it is rational 
for a player to choose C if and only if there is a reason to 
expect the co-player to choose it, so the crucial question is 
whether a player has sufficient reason to expect a co-player 
to choose C. There is clearly no such reason, because the 
game is perfectly symmetric, and the co-player faces exactly 
the same dilemma. Standard game theory has no way to dis-
tinguish between Nash equilibria, or to direct rational play-
ers towards more attractive solutions of the game.
The “refinement programme” of standard game theory 
sought stronger solution concepts than Nash equilibrium, 
in order to shrink the number of rational solutions in games 
with multiple Nash equilibria. However, a large number of 
refinements have been suggested and there are no accepted 
principles for choosing between them (Kreps 1990). Further, 
some refinements of game theory suggest that players should 
choose to hunt hare in the Stag Hunt game. Although the 
(C, C) equilibrium is payoff dominant, the (D, D) equilib-
rium is risk dominant in a sense defined mathematically by 
Harsanyi and Selten (1988, pp. 82–89), and risk dominance 
provides a reason for choosing D. Intuitively, it is obvious 
that D is much safer: a C choice risks a possible payoff of 
zero, whereas the worst possible payoff from a D choice is 7.
The Hi-Lo game shown in Fig. 2 strips the payoff-dom-
inance phenomenon bare and exposes the problem more 
starkly. Schelling (1960) introduced this game, calling it 
a “pure common-interest game” (p. 291), and Bacharach 
named it “Hi-Lo” in unpublished manuscripts and talks in 
the mid-1990s; the name probably first appeared in print in 
Bacharach and Stahl (2000). Using the template in Fig. 1 
(right), the Hi-Lo game is defined by the inequalities and 
equalities R > P > S = T = 0. It is essentially a Stag Hunt 
game with the payoffs in the off-diagonal cells set to zero; 
(H, H) and (L, L) are Nash equilibria, and (H, H) is strongly 
payoff-dominant over (L, L), as in the Stag Hunt game. Any 
2 × 2 game that has positive payoffs (R, R) and (P, P) in the 
main diagonal and zero payoffs elsewhere is a Hi-Lo game, 
provided that R > P > 0.
In the Hi-Lo game, there is no complication arising from 
risk dominance, and H seems the obviously rational strat-
egy choice. But, again, each player has a reason to choose 
H if and only if there is a reason to expect the co-player to 
choose it also, and there can be no such reason, because the 
co-player has a reason to choose H if and only if there is a 
reason to expect the first player to choose it. We are stuck in 
a vicious circle that provides neither player with any reason, 
based on the standard assumptions of game theory, to prefer 
H to L.
In spite of this vicious circle, the Hi-Lo game induces a 
powerful intuition in human decision makers that H is the 
rational choice, and experimental evidence confirms that vir-
tually all players choose it (Bardsley et al. 2010). Standard 
game theory cannot account for this phenomenon of coor-
dination through payoff dominance.
3  Some Unsatisfactory Explanations 
of Mutualistic Cooperation
There are a number of well-known suggestions, with a 
long pedigree in the literature, that attempt to explain why 
rational players would achieve payoff dominant outcomes 
in common interest games (some formulated with respect to 
Stag Hunt and others with respect to Hi-Lo). However, they 
are all generally agreed to be flawed.
3.1  Payoff‑Dominance Principle
Harsanyi and Selten (1988, pp. 357–359) proposed adding 
another axiom to the standard rationality assumptions, the 
payoff-dominance principle. According to this principle, 
rational players choose payoff-dominant equilibria when-
ever they exist. However, this provides no insight into the 
phenomenon it is designed to accommodate, and Harsanyi 
and Selten acknowledged it to be an unsatisfactory and tem-
porary workaround.
Part of the attraction of the idea that a rational solution to 
a game must be a Nash equilibrium is that Nash equilibria 
are “self-enforcing”: since every player is doing the best they 
can, given the strategies of the other players, no-one has any 
incentive to deviate. Harsanyi and Selten (1988) argued that 
risk dominance is important only where there is uncertainty 
about what the other players will do. When there is a sin-
gle payoff-dominant outcome, it is obvious what the players 
should do. Therefore one might think that a non-binding 
agreement to play a payoff dominant equilibrium would be 
self-enforcing and, hence, a rational solution to the game.
Aumann (1990) argued that non-binding agreements to 
play the payoff-dominant equilibrium will not always be 
self-enforcing. If each player has strict preferences over the 
other’s strategy choice, so she always wants her opponent to 
choose a particular strategy regardless of what she herself 
intends to do, then pre-play messages convey information 
only about what the players want their opponents to do. 
This information is already common knowledge (because 




H 2, 2 0, 0
L 0, 0 1, 1
Fig. 2  Hi-Lo game, with R > P > S = T = 0
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the pre-play communication conveys no new information 
about what the player herself intends and, hence, it has no 
effect on the outcome of the game. In the Stag Hunt, each 
player strictly prefers that the other plays C (and both players 
already know this, since the payoffs are common knowl-
edge). Without enforceable agreements, pre-play communi-
cation about playing C conveys no information about behav-
iour and hence does not affect the outcome of the game.
Harsanyi (1995, p. 94, fn. 3) abandoned the payoff-domi-
nance principle, having been convinced by Aumann’s (1990) 
argument.
3.2  Salience
A salient item in a group is “one that stands out from the 
rest by its uniqueness in some conspicuous respect” (Lewis 
1969). Many decades ago, Schelling (1960) showed that 
people are remarkably adept at using salient focal points to 
solve problems of coordination. There is no doubt that the 
(H, H) outcome in the Hi-Lo game is a focal point by virtue 
of the fact that it conspicuously offers higher payoffs than 
any other outcome.
However, while salience might be part of a psychologi-
cal explanation of coordination, it is not enough to ground 
a rational H-choice. Salience singles out a combination of 
actions as being conspicuous. In order for it to give play-
ers a reason to play H, it must single out a combination of 
actions as being the one that the player should do her part 
in. So we must ask why the conspicuous combination is the 
one in which the agent personally has reason to do her part. 
In answering why the agent has reason to do her part, we 
cannot appeal to salience, as that would be circular (Gilbert 
1989).
Any attempt to derive, from the standard assumptions, a 
reason for choosing a strategy associated with the payoff-
dominant equilibrium generates a version of this vicious cir-
cle. This is now generally acknowledged by game theorists 
(e.g., Anderlini 1999; Aumann and Sorin 1989; Bacharach 
2006, Chap. 1; Bardsley et al. 2010; Janssen 2001, 2006).
3.3  Principle of Indifference
The principle of indifference (also called the principle of 
insufficient reason) is that, if there is no evidence favouring 
one possibility over another, then we should assign them the 
same probability. As applied to the Hi-Lo game, the princi-
ple of indifference suggests that, since Player 1 (for example) 
has no reason to expect Player 2 to choose H or L in the 
Hi-Lo game, then Player 1 should assign equal probabilities 
to each of these choices. Under that assumption, Player 1’s 
expected payoff from choosing H is obviously higher than 
from choosing L, because ½(2) + ½(0) = 1 and ½(0) + ½(1) 
= ½, therefore Player 1 will choose the expected-payoff-
maximizing strategy H.
This argument is fallacious because the problem is not 
one of individual decision making, where standard decision 
theory and simple expected utility maximization apply: 
Player 2 is not indifferent Nature but an intelligent player 
who can and will formulate and respond to expectations 
about Player 1’s intentions. If the argument from the princi-
ple of indifference were valid, then by the common knowl-
edge assumption, Player 2 would anticipate Player 1’s choice 
of H and would choose a best reply to it, namely H. But this 
means that Player 2 would choose H with certainty, and that 
contradicts the assumption on which Player 1’s argument for 
choosing H is based, namely that Player 2 is equally likely 
to choose H or L.
Closely related fallacies based on probabilities are dis-
cussed in greater depth by Colman et al. (2014).
4  Team Reasoning Solves Common Interest 
Games
According to theories of team reasoning, players solve com-
mon-interest games like Hi-Lo or Stag Hunt by adopting a 
distinctive mode of reasoning from preferences to strategy 
choices (Bacharach 1999, 2006; Sugden 1993, 2003, 2015). 
Standard game-theoretic reasoning amounts to asking What 
do I want? and, given my knowledge of the game and my 
expectations of what my co-player(s) will do, What should I 
do to achieve this? Team reasoning alters the unit of agency 
from the individual to the pair or more generally the group of 
players by allowing each player to ask What do we want? and 
What should I do to play my part in achieving this? Team-
reasoning players first search for an outcome that would be 
best for the group of players; if such an outcome exists and 
is unique, then they identify and play their component strate-
gies of the jointly optimal strategy profile.2 Within this theo-
retical framework, standard individual reasoning is merely a 
special case of team reasoning when the team has only one 
member (Gold and Sugden 2007a, b).
2 The theory is not well developed in the case where there is no 
uniquely best outcome, although it seems that some versions of the 
theory could accommodate this possibility. Bacharach’s (2006) theory 
is an obvious candidate for this, if we allow the team reasoning solu-
tion to admit mixed strategies. This seems plausible, since Bacha-
rach’s theory already allows that group-identifying individuals maxi-
mize the expected team utility, which is required when playing mixed 
strategies. Sugden (2015, p. 156) modifies his original (1991, 1993) 
position so that it does not require individuals to identify a uniquely 
team-optimal solution. He says that mutually beneficial conventions 
can be team reasoning solutions even if players would not be able to 
discover these conventions by reasoning about optimal solutions.
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Team reasoning provides a solution to the problems of 
coordination and payoff dominance as follows. In Aumann’s 
Stag Hunt game (Fig. 1), a team-reasoning player notes that 
the (C, C) strategy profile is uniquely optimal for the player 
pair, because it offers the best possible payoff to both, and no 
other strategy profile yields either player a payoff as good as 
the payoff in (C, C). If there is common knowledge that both 
players adopt the team-reasoning mode of choosing their 
strategies, both therefore select and play their C strategies. 
It is essentially the same in the Hi-Lo game shown in Fig. 2. 
The (H, H) strategy profile is uniquely optimal for the player 
pair, because it yields the best possible payoffs to both play-
ers, therefore team-reasoning players select and play their 
H strategies. Team reasoning solves any coordination game 
with a payoff-dominant outcome in the same way.
Team reasoning involves both a preference transforma-
tion and an agency transformation. There is a preference 
transformation, from the individual to the group (or team) 
preferences. There is also an agency transformation, with 
the group of players being treated as a single entity. The 
agency transformation is essential to solving common inter-
est games. To see this, consider the two-player Hi-Lo game. 
A theory that only involved payoff transformations and not 
agency transformations would not change the recommenda-
tions of standard game theory. Imagine that the players each 
care about the other player’s outcome and that they apply 
some weight λ and (1 − λ) to their outcome and the other 
player’s outcome respectively. In a two player game, if each 
player i’s individual outcome is xi then we can represent the 
transformed utility as λxi + (1 − λ)xj; λ = 1 corresponds to 
complete egoism and λ = 0 to complete altruism. (This is a 
pretty standard approach; Collard 1978, explores its implica-
tions for the fundamental theorems of economics). In Hi-Lo, 
xi = xj in all outcomes so, whatever the value of λ, the payoff 
matrix does not change. Therefore there is still an equilib-
rium selection problem. The agency transformation part of 
team reasoning allows profile selection. From the perspec-
tive of the team, Hi-Lo has a uniquely best profile, so the 
theory of team reasoning can predict H-play, provided there 
is common knowledge of team reasoning. Similarly, the best 
that can be hoped for with the transformed Stag Hunt game 
is that it will become a Hi-Lo, where the two players’ inter-
ests are completely aligned but there are still two Nash equi-
libria, but with common knowledge of group identification 
the theory of team reasoning can predict C-play. In the next 
section, we discuss what happens if this common knowledge 
assumption is relaxed.
5  Team Reasoning and Pareto‑Dominant 
but Non‑equilibrium Outcomes
Although team reasoning was originally developed to solve 
the problem of coordination in Hi-Lo, it also provides a 
compelling explanation for altruistic cooperation in the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma. Figure 3 shows the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game (T > R > P > S and 2R > S + T) with the now conven-
tional payoff values popularized by Axelrod (1984). It has 
a unique Nash equilibrium at (D, D), and the D strategy is a 
strongly dominant strategy for both players in the sense that 
it yields a better payoff than C irrespective of the co-player’s 
choice. Nevertheless, experimental studies have invariably 
revealed that many human decision makers cooperate, even 
when the game is played just once, and multiplayer versions 
of this game also elicit frequent cooperation (Balliet and 
Van Lange 2012).
Team reasoning explains cooperation in the prisoner’s 
dilemma very easily. In Fig. 3, if a team-reasoning player 
interprets the collective payoff in the simplest and most 
intuitive way, as simply the sum of payoffs to the two play-
ers, then it becomes obvious that the (C, C) strategy profile 
is uniquely optimal for the player pair because 3 + 3 = 6 is 
a larger joint payoff than in any other outcome. (See Gold 
2012; Gold 2018; Colman and Gold 2017, or Karpus and 
Gold 2016 for discussion of different interpretations of the 
payoff function.) If there is common knowledge that both 
players adopt the team-reasoning mode, then both will play 
C, their component strategies in this uniquely optimal pro-
file. But what happens if the common knowledge condition 
is not fulfilled?
Bacharach (1999, 2006) developed a theory of unreliable 
team interaction that allows the possibility of team reason-
ing when players are uncertain whether or not other play-
ers will use team reasoning. Let us say that an individual 
“identifies” with a group if she conceives of that group as a 
unit of agency, acting as a single entity in pursuit of some 
single objective (Gold and Sugden 2007a, b; Gold 2018). 
For Bacharach, whether a player identifies with a particular 
group is a matter of psychology, or how she frames the deci-
sion problem. He defined a frame as the set of concepts that 
a player uses to conceptualize a problem. In order to engage 




C 3, 3 0, 5
D 5, 0 1, 1
Fig. 3  Prisoner’s Dilemma game, with T > R > P > S and 2R > S + T 
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frame must include the concept “we.” Players who are in 
such a we-frame will adopt team reasoning. (This telescopes 
several steps in a single process. For critical discussion, see 
Gold 2012).
Bacharach’s theory includes a parameter ω (0 ≤ ω ≤ 1), 
representing the probability that any individual player will 
be in a we-frame, and hence group identify and team reason. 
In Bacharach’s (1999, 2006) presentation, the value of ω is 
common knowledge among all players. In Gold and Sug-
den’s (2006, 2007a, b) presentation of Bacharach’s theory, 
the value of ω is assumed to be common knowledge only 
among those players who group identify. One reason for 
making this change stems from Bacharach’s theory of fram-
ing. Bacharach often compares framing to seeing. If his idea 
is that players who reason individualistically do not have 
the concept “we” in their frame, then it is hard to see how 
they can even recognise the possibility of the we-frame, in 
which case they cannot have beliefs about the probability 
that others adopt it and are team reasoners. An alternative 
way to reconcile framing and knowledge about ω, which 
would allow individualistic reasoners to have beliefs about 
ω, would be to have an interpretation of framing that is not 
only ‘seeing’ but also ‘endorsing’ particular concepts as 
the lens through which to interpret the situation, and those 
concepts having ‘motivational grip’ (Gold 2012). The ω is 
the probability that the we-frame has motivational grip. In 
either case, team reasoners then maximize the expected team 
payoff, taking into account the probability of group identi-
fication by the co-player(s). As in standard game theory, in 
equilibrium all beliefs turn out to be correct.
In Bacharach’s theory, a player will sometimes adopt the 
team-reasoning mode even without assurance that the co-
player(s) have identified with the group, that is, when ω < 1, 
and may thus end up receiving a worse individual payoff 
than expected. His theory also allows the possibility that 
the off-diagonal outcomes in the prisoner’s dilemma, (C, 
D) and (D, C), are ranked higher by the team than the Nash 
equilibrium outcome, (D, D). In this case, a team reasoning 
player could play C despite a belief that the co-player(s) will 
certainly reason individually (ω = 0). Assuming once again 
that the collective payoff is simply the sum of individual 
payoffs, a simple and clear case in point is the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game shown in Fig. 3. In this game, whenever one 
player cooperates and the other defects, the collective payoff 
to the player pair (5) is greater than when both defect (2); 
therefore even if ω = 0, a team-reasoning player will choose 
C, expecting a personal payoff of zero. This is not an issue 
for Bacharach, since a team reasoner considers that what 
matters for her is the team payoff and does what is instru-
mentally rational for the team; in contrast, it is something 
that Sugden (1993, 2003, 2015) is deeply concerned about.
In Sugden’s (1993, 2003) theory, a player never deliber-
ately pays a personal cost for team reasoning. For Sugden, 
individuals are motivated to adopt the team-reasoning mode 
only by a promise of a better individual outcome for eve-
ryone involved in the interaction. Sugden (2011) casts his 
version of team reasoning as benefiting each individual in 
comparison to a noncooperative default. Sugden (2015) 
defines the default as each player’s maximin payoff, the 
highest payoff that she can guarantee herself independently 
of other players’ strategy choices, and says that each player 
must benefit relative to this benchmark. (See Karpus and 
Radzvilas 2017, for a formalization of this.) It follows that, 
for Sugden, the collective utility function, or later (Sugden 
2015) the goal of achieving common interests, can never 
make an individual player worse off, and in a Prisoner’s 
Dilemma, a team will never prefer an asymmetric outcome 
that gives one player a poor personal payoff to joint defection 
with better personal payoffs but a worse collective payoff.3
For the same reason, in Sugden’s theory a player will 
not adopt team reasoning without having assurance that 
the co-player will also cooperate. Players engage in team 
reasoning only if they have reason to believe that the other 
player(s) identify with the group, endorse the idea of mutu-
ally assured team reasoning, and accept the idea that the goal 
is to maximize the collective payoff of the group (Sugden 
2003), or (in later writings) to achieve the group’s common 
interests. Reason to believe could be generated, for example, 
by a tannoy announcement or by induction from a previously 
existing convention.
In later writings, Sugden (2011, 2015) takes pains to dif-
ferentiate his version of team reasoning from that of Bacha-
rach (1999, 2006). Sugden (2011) contrasts his version of 
team reasoning with that of Bacharach, comparing their dif-
ferent interpretations of the question ‘What is it rational for 
us do?’. For Bacharach, this involves maximising a team 
objective, whereas Sugden (2011) re-interprets the question 
as ‘What are the terms of an agreement that it would be 
rational for each to make if all could be assured that the 
agreement would be kept?’. For Sugden, the benchmark for 
team reasoning is the payoffs that the payers could achieve 
as individuals and he prefers to speak of the players’ ‘com-
mon interests’ instead of a team utility function; he makes a 
deliberate move to the language of cooperative game theory 
(Sugden 2015). To some extent, this move is rhetorical. It 
is still possible to model Sugden’s provisos using expected 
utility theory (Gold 2012). The need for mutual benefit and 
the introduction of cooperative game theory can be thought 
3 Sugden’s position has changed over the years. Sugden (2000) takes 
a line very close to Bacharach’s, saying that the team utility function 
represents the preferences of the group and “It does seem possible in 
fact for people to construe themselves as members of a plural agent 
whose collective objective is contrary to the unanimous preferences 
of those members”. However, he has since moved away from this 
position.
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of as putting constraints on the team utility function, the 
need for assurance suggests that players will not team reason 
unless ω = 1.
Later Sugden (2011, 2015) says that a convention can be 
a team reasoning solution even if it is not optimal, so long as 
it is mutually beneficial compared to individuals’ maximin 
payoffs. Under this definition, (L, L) can be a team reasoning 
solution of Hi-Lo. Thus the most recent version of Sugden’s 
theory no longer possesses the advantage of predicting pay-
off-dominant outcomes as the unique team reasoning solu-
tion and therefore it is out of the scope of this paper.
In Prisoner’s Dilemmas, as in common interest games, 
agency transformation is required as well as a payoff trans-
formation. This can be revealed by applying the transfor-
mation above, where the individual xi’s utility is λxi + (1 
– λ) xj, to the Prisoner’s Dilemma in Fig. 3. If λ = 1/2, then 
the game is transformed into a Hi-Lo game (see Gold and 
Sugden 2007b). In fact a common feature of most “solu-
tions” to the Prisoner’s Dilemma is that they transform (C, 
C) into an equilibrium but do not change the equilibrium 
status of (D, D) (Gold 2012). Depending on the values of 
the off-diagonal payoffs, they either transform the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma into a Hi-Lo game or a Stag Hunt. As we saw 
above, to definitely solve these games, team reasoning is 
needed to de-conditionalize players’ strategies. Even com-
pletely self-sacrificing players cannot solve their problem in 
the Prisoner’s Dilemma. If λ = 1, we have what Parfit (1984) 
calls “the altruists dilemma”: the players each want to play D 
in order to benefit the other (and this remains the dominant 
strategy) but they could have each helped the other more if 
they had both agreed to play C.
6  Other Explanations of Mutualistic 
Cooperation Assessed with Respect 
to Their Rationality
Team reasoning is not the only current explanation of mutu-
alistic cooperation. There is empirical evidence to support 
the idea that people team reason in common interest games 
(Bardsley and Ule 2017; Bardsley et al. 2010; Butler 2012; 
Gold and Thom, unpublished manuscript), but there is also 
empirical evidence to support other theories. We explain the 
fundamental ideas behind the principle alternative theories 
in relation to the simple Hi-Lo game shown in Fig. 2 and 
discuss how they relate to rationality. We do not consider 
the psychology of mutualistic cooperation. Readers inter-
ested in that can consult a companion paper (Colman and 
Gold 2017).
6.1  Social Projection Theory and Evidential 
Reasoning
According to social projection theory (Acevedo and Krue-
ger 2005; Krueger 2007; Krueger et al. 2012), most peo-
ple expect others to behave as they do, and they therefore 
assume that, if they choose H (Fig. 2), then the co-player is 
also likely to choose H. It follows that a player expects to 
receive a payoff of 2 by choosing H and 1 by choosing L, 
and this provides a reason for choosing H. Al-Nowaihi and 
Dhami (2015) have recently developed a formal equilibrium 
concept based on this theory.
Social projection theory provides a psychological but not 
necessarily a rational mechanism for H-choice. It is related 
to what economists and philosophers call evidential rea-
soning or magical thinking, which is generally regarded as 
irrational (Binmore 1992; Elster 1989; Joyce 1999; Lewis 
1979; Quattrone and Tversky 1984). The problem is that 
it mistakes correlation for causation. The irrationality of 
doing this is often discussed with respect to the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (Lewis 1979). If there is reason to believe that the 
two players are similar, then a player who is considering 
playing D has evidence that the other player is also con-
sidering playing D and a player considering playing C has 
evidence that the other player is considering doing likewise. 
Nevertheless, the dominant strategy is still to play D, as it 
gives a higher playoff regardless of what the other player 
chooses. If the other player is going to choose C, then our 
reasoner would be better off choosing D. If choosing D is a 
sign that the other player is also likely to play D, then this is 
simply bad news. It does not have any causal import.
In economics, modellers have incorporated evidential 
reasoning by introducing action-dependent beliefs and 
allowing players to maximize expected utility conditional 
on their own action (Hammond 2009; Mandler 2007; Masel 
2007). In a Bayesian model of belief formation, is possi-
ble to rationalise a player having beliefs about other players 
that depend her action (Board 2006; Larrouy and Lecouteux 
2017). Never-the-less, the correlations between the players’ 
actions are not causal correlations and ignoring the lack of 
causality is generally believed to be irrational (Lewis 1979; 
Gibbard and Harper 1978). Rational action requires ‘a 
proper kind of connection to desires, beliefs, and evidence’ 
(Elster 1986, p. 2) and correlations that are not causal are 
not considered to be a proper kind of connection. Indeed, 
the majority of the economists modelling action-dependent 
beliefs intend to model a psychological phenomenon and are 
at best agnostic about its rationality (Hammond 2009; Masel 
2007; Larrouy and Lecouteux 2017).
There is an extended debate about the rationality of evi-
dential reasoning, but the majority of decision theorists 
come down against it. For more discussion see Weirich 
(2016).
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6.2  Cognitive Hierarchy Theory
Cognitive hierarchy and Level-k theories (Camerer et al. 
2004; Stahl and Wilson 1994, 1995) are designed to model 
players who reason with varying levels of strategic depth. 
Level-0 players have no beliefs about their co-players and 
choose strategies either randomly, with uniform probability, 
or by using simple heuristics such as salience; Level-1 play-
ers maximize their own payoffs relative to a belief that their 
co-players are Level-0 players; Level-2 players maximize 
their own payoffs relative to a belief that their co-players are 
Level-1 players; and so on. Experiments have confirmed the 
findings of Camerer et al. that Level-1 is most common, fol-
lowed by Level-2 (Bardsley et al. 2010; Colman et al. 2014), 
although there is a worry that Level-0 behaviours may not 
be consistent across games (Heap et al. 2014).
Cognitive hierarchy theory can predict H-choice in Hi-Lo. 
If a Level-1 player assumes that her co-player is choosing 
between H and L randomly, with equal probability, then 
choosing H yields an expected payoff of 1, whereas choos-
ing L yields ½. Hence she concludes that she should choose 
H. Level-2 players choose H because they expect their co-
players to choose H with certainty, and the same applies at 
higher levels.
This may provide a model of behaviour, but it is not 
rational behaviour according to standard game theory. The 
choices of Level-0 players are being treated as parametric, 
not as the choices of rationally responding players, similar 
to the criticism of the principle of insufficient reason above. 
Further, even for those levels that are reasoning, their beliefs 
about the distribution of other players in the population (the 
percentage of level-0, 1, and 2 s) will often turn out to be 
incorrect.
6.3  Strong Stackelberg Reasoning
Strong Stackelberg reasoning (Colman and Bacharach 1997; 
Colman et al. 2014; Colman and Stirk 1998; Pulford et al. 
2014) entails an assumption that players choose strategies as 
though their co-players could anticipate their choices. Thus, 
a Stackelberg reasoner chooses as though expecting a choice 
of H to be anticipated by the co-player, who would therefore 
choose H, and an L choice to be met with an L choice by the 
co-player for the same reason. The Stackelberg reasoner gets 
a better payoff in the first case than the second and therefore 
chooses H.
Stackelberg reasoning is a generalization of the “mino-
rant” and “majorant” models introduced by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern (1944), Sect. 14.4.1, pp. 100–104, in their 
analysis of zero-sum games. von Neumann and Morgen-
stern’s objective was to determine how a rational player 
could exploit the payoff structure of the game to get the 
maximum payoff that can be obtained independently of the 
rival’s behaviour (Giocoli 2003, p. 265). They introduced the 
“minorant” and “majorant” games as a technique to identify 
the range of payoffs that a player could guarantee, if she 
were in the best or worse possible situation. They made the 
assumption that players reason as though any strategy choice 
will be anticipated by the co-player, which is also made in 
Strong Stackleberg reasoning, and used it to rationalize their 
solution of zero sum games.4 Similiarly, in Strong Stackle-
berg reasoning, the objective is to determine how a rational 
player could exploit the payoff structure of the game to get 
the maximum payoff that can be obtained independently of 
the rival’s behaviour. In Stackelberg-soluble games, it yields 
precisely the strategy that maximizes one’s payoff irrespec-
tive of the worst that the co-player could do in response (i.e., 
assuming, exactly as in von Neumann and Morgenstern, that 
the co-player always does what would be worst from the first 
player’s viewpoint).
Strong Stackelberg reasoning differs from social projec-
tion theory because social projection theory requires that 
players believe that their co-players’ actions are depend-
ent on their own, but in Stackleberg reasoning they merely 
behave as though this were the case as a heuristic device 
to clarify the situation. There is no necessary assumption 
that people who use strong Stackelberg reasoning actually 
believe that others can anticipate their choices, merely that 
they act as though this were the case, and the player’s beliefs 
about the other players’ strategy choices turn out to be cor-
rect in equilibrium.
6.4  Virtual Bargaining
The theory of virtual bargaining (Misyak and Chater 2014; 
Misyak et al. 2014) proposes that individuals reason about 
problems of coordination by considering what strategies they 
would agree on if they could bargain or negotiate explicitly. 
In the Hi-Lo game and arguably also in the Stag Hunt game, 
it is obvious what bargain they would arrive at, hence com-
munication is unnecessary and they choose the appropriate 
H or C strategies directly.
In terms of rationality, virtual bargaining suffers from a 
similar problem to that in the discussion of salience, above: 
Why does the fact that a combination would be the outcome 
of bargaining give the agents a reason to choose it? We can 
even grant that bargaining and contracts give reasons, but in 
this case no bargaining has actually taken place. This ech-
oes Dworkin’s (1973, p. 501) line about hypothetical social 
contract theories, that ‘A hypothetical contract is not simply 
4 In their strictly competitive (2-player, zero-sum) case, Stackelberg 
reasoning always converges on an equilibrium, hence all such games 
are Stackelberg-soluble, whereas in the general case (including pure 
coordination and mixed-motive games) it doesn’t necessarily con-
verge.
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a pale form of an actual contract; it is no contract at all.’ 
Dworkin’s point was that there are no grounds to enforce a 
hypothetical contract; equally there are no rational grounds 
to expect that other players will do their part.
7  The Rationality of Team Reasoning
Instrumental practical reasoning presupposes a unit of 
agency. Standard game theory limits the unit of agency to 
the individual. The theory of team reasoning allows that 
there can be multiple levels of agency and includes them 
in the model. It is a theory of choices made by group mem-
bers, who think about what they should do as a member of 
the group, so the standard theory is a special case when the 
number of group members equals one (Gold and Sugden 
2007a, b). (A similar approach can be used with choice over 
time, where standard theory adopts the time-slice as the unit 
of agency and team reasoning can introduce the level of 
the individual Gold 2013; Gold, in press.) Team reasoning 
introduces a new primitive into the theory, about the level 
of agency or the team, and also players’ beliefs about the 
level of agency (whether other players will group identify), 
which turn out to be correct in equilibrium. Therefore, the 
theory of team reasoning can conclude that, when a player 
identifies with the group, it is rational for her to choose the 
strategy that leads to the payoff-dominant outcome. Game 
theory, like expected utility theory, is a theory of instrumen-
tal rationality. Its normative recommendations are about how 
a player can best achieve her ends (given her beliefs), but 
it takes those ends as given; they are prior to instrumental 
rationality. The phenomenon of payoff-dominance poses a 
problem for standard game theory because a unique recom-
mendation to play the strategies involved in payoff-dominant 
outcomes requires the individual to do what is best for the 
group. By allowing that groups can be agents, the theory 
of team reasoning allows that the group can be instrumen-
tally rational, and shows how outcomes that are good for the 
group can be achieved through the rational decision-making 
of the individual members, given that they group identify. 
Therefore, according to the theory of team reasoning, if 
there is a team agent, then the pay-off dominant outcome of 
a game is the unique rational solution. It explains mutualis-
tic cooperation while maintaining the same connections as 
standard game theory between preferences, evidence, and 
actions.5
This leaves the questions of how individuals come to iden-
tify with group and whether it can be instrumentally rational 
for them to do so. Bacharach and Sugden differ on the ques-
tion of how but agree that group identification is not the sub-
ject of rational choice. For Bacharach (2006), group identifi-
cation is a psychological process and therefore not amenable 
to rational choice. His hypothesis is that games with a single 
Pareto-dominant outcome will tend to induce group identi-
fication, but this is an empirical hypothesis. In his theory, 
the evaluation of options is done by an agent who is already 
using a frame, there is no point where an agent can evaluate 
which frame would be better to adopt. For Sugden (1993, 
2000, 2003), group identification is a matter of choice, but 
nevertheless the choice cannot be evaluated with respect to 
instrumental rationality (Gold and Sugden 2007a, b). Sugden 
thinks that people may choose to team reason in situations 
where there is the possibility of mutual advantage, but they 
are not rationally required to. For him, as for Bacharach, all 
goals are the goals of agents and it is not possible to evaluate 
those goals without first specifying the unit of agency.
In contrast, Hurley (1989, p. 145) says that “an adequate 
theory of rational choice should address the question of 
what the unit of agency among those possible should be”. 
She suggests that the source of evaluation of outcomes is 
not given by the unit of agency. There are two ways that 
the source of evaluation could come apart from the unit of 
agency and neither of them are promising routes for a theory 
of instrumentally rational choice of the unit of agency.
A closer look at Hurley’s position reveals the bind. Hurley 
says that, “As an individual I can recognise that a collective 
unit of which I am merely a part can bring about outcomes 
that I prefer to any that I could bring about by acting as an 
individual unit.” (Hurley 2005, p. 203). The most straight-
forward reading of this is that we should privilege the indi-
vidual perspective and individual goals. However, once we 
acknowledge that there are multiple levels of agency, it is 
not clear why one should privilege the individual level over 
the group level for the purpose of making evaluations. Intui-
tively, individuals are privileged in our ontology; the ques-
tion is whether instrumental rationality requires privileging 
individual goals or whether some other form of argument is 
needed to fill the gap.
In the context of standard game theory and instrumental 
rationality, one might think that individuals are privileged 
in virtue of being the units that make choices. However, 
that is not sufficient to make them the unit of rational evalu-
ations—it is actually not even strictly speaking true, as we 
can see by considering how rational choice theory models 
individuals who make a series of choices over time. Here, 
the individuals is modelled as a sequence of selves at a time, 
or ‘timeslices’, and different timeslices may have different 
preferences. This can lead to strategic interactions between 
timeslices, which we might think of as intra-personal games, 
5 This paragraph is true of Bacharch’s theory of team reasoning and 
is also explicit in Sugden (2000) and Gold & Sugden (2007a, b), 
although in more recent work Sugden has moved away from the con-
ception of team reasoning as instrumental rationality for groups (Sug-
den 2015).
314 N. Gold, A. M. Colman 
1 3
and which lead to problems of coordination and cooperation 
that parallel those in the inter-personal case (Read 2001; 
Gold 2013; Gold, in press). This way of modelling the self 
over time is natural because the timeslice is the locus of 
choice. From this, we can take two lessons. First, even in 
game theory, the real locus of decision-making is the times-
lice, it is just that in most games the individual players’ pref-
erences are stable over the time frame of the interaction, 
so we can model them as one single individual preference 
ordering. Second, once we think of individuals like this, 
the case for privileging the evaluative stance of the locus of 
decision making looks less appealing (although Parfit 1984 
does take that position). That would involve privileging the 
timeslice in the intra-personal case, whereas most people’s 
intuition is that it is the individual over time that is privi-
leged, not the timeslice.
People have expressed the hope that principles of rational 
identification can be found. The most promising place to 
look for them seems to be in an account of the worth of a life 
and the importance of life projects. However, this is begin-
ning to look like a project in ethics or morality, not one in 
rationality, except maybe in a thick Kantian sense of ration-
ality where the moral law is a truth that can be discovered by 
reason. Even if such a theory can be constructed, it will not 
be a theory of instrumental rationality. For instance, Parfit 
(1984) argues that rationality resides with the timeslice, but 
that the timeslice may be required to do what is best for the 
individual or the group as a part of a consequentialist moral-
ity. In contrast, Korsgaard (1989) argues that the rationality 
of pursuing intertemporal projects implies that it is rational 
to prioritise the individual rather than the timeslice. But 
Korsgaard’s is a Kantian conception of rationality, where it 
is rational to do what we have reason to do. Therefore, it is 
a thick conception of rationality, in the sense that it judges 
the rationality of ends, and not merely a thin instrumental 
theory of rationality, which takes the agent’s ends as given.
An alternative way of reading Hurley is that we should 
look for an agent-neutral perspective from which to evaluate 
the options, while acknowledging that all thinking is done 
by individuals. It is easy to see how an agent-neutral per-
spective enters the picture if a moral evaluation is being 
made. For instance, Utilitarianism is an agent-neutral moral 
theory; an agent could make a Utilitarian evaluation and 
then use that to decide what team membership to adopt. 
Regan (1980) offers such a theory. However, the agents in 
this theory have already chosen to adopt moral ends. We lack 
a story about why a rational agent should adopt moral ends. 
This is an old chestnut, going back at least as far as Plato’s 
Republic, which still lacks a satisfactory solution. Further, 
it seems that there are insuperable obstacles to solving the 
problem of rational group identification within a theory of 
purely instrumental rationality. A reasoning process already 
presumes an agent who is doing the reasoning. As Bardsley 
(2001: 185) puts it, “the question should I ask myself “what 
am I to do?” or “what are we to do?”? presupposes a first 
person singular point of view”. Therefore it is hard to see 
how an instrumentally rational process of evaluation of the 
unit of agency can occur.
A similar problem holds for Gauthier (1986), who has 
long held that it can be instrumentally rational to cooper-
ate in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. In a recent re-working 
of his theory, Gauthier (2013) contrasts two opposed con-
ceptions of deliberative rationality: maximization, which is 
equivalent to individualistic best-response reasoning, and 
Pareto-optimization, which is equivalent to team reasoning, 
although he doesn’t call it that (Karpus and Gold 2016). 
Gauthier suggests that Pareto-optimization is a necessary 
condition for rationality in multi-player games. His justifica-
tion for team reasoning is that it would pass a contractarian 
test, so Pareto-optimization is, as he puts it, a part of “social 
morality” (2013, p. 624). His position is very similar to that 
of Sugden (2015), except that Gauthier holds that social 
morality is part of instrumentally rational choice. However, 
Gauthier recognises that he lacks an argument to support 
this. For the reasons explained above, we are pessimistic that 
such an argument exists.
Never-the-less, team reasoning is an important addition 
to game theory because it allows that groups can be agents 
and shows how individuals who obey the standard rationality 
assumptions can do their part in achieving the outcome that 
is instrumentally rational for the group. This is important 
for economics and decision theory. In decision theory, an 
agent is an entity with preferences that acts instrumentally to 
achieve its ends (given its beliefs), usually modelled as max-
imizing a utility function. In economics, it is actually stand-
ard to model some groups as agents, most obviously firms, 
but also diverse groups such as families, political parties, 
and trade unions. The theory of team reasoning is important 
because it makes space for individual and collective rational-
ity in the same model, and shows how pursuing the group 
objective can be rational for the individual team members, 
within the standard assumptions of game theoretic rational-
ity. Team reasoning is also relevant for philosophers who 
want to connect individual and collective action, and indi-
vidual and collective intentions (Gold and Sugden 2007a, b). 
However, anyone making an argument that it is normatively 
required to group identify and team reason will have to draw 
on resources other than instrumental rationality.
8  Conclusion
Although the Prisoner’s Dilemma has garnered most atten-
tion, problems of mutualistic cooperation are fundamental. 
Team reasoning can explain rational coordination on mutu-
alistically cooperative outcomes, such as (C, C) in the Stag 
315Team Reasoning and the Rational Choice of Payoff-Dominant Outcomes in Games 
1 3
Hunt and (H, H) in Hi-Lo. The theory of team reasoning 
generalizes game theory, by introducing the possibility that 
groups can be the unit of agency, with standard game the-
ory as a special case when the group only consists of one 
player. Team reasoning can also explain why it is sometimes 
rational to cooperate in a Prisoner’s Dilemma, where the 
Pareto-dominant outcome is not a Nash equilibrium.
Team reasoning explains how it can be rational to coop-
erate, within the rationality assumptions of standard game 
theory. Theories of team reasoning allow that groups can 
be instrumentally rational agents with goals (which we can 
represent as team preference orderings) and that individuals 
within groups can rationally choose to do their parts in order 
to achieve the outcome that is ranked highest by the group. 
Some people have hoped we can find an argument that it is 
instrumentally rational to group identify. But any theory of 
the rational choice of the unit of agency faces the problem 
of how to specify goals and evaluate outcomes independent 
of the unit of agency. If we take our goals from our moral 
theory, that turns team reasoning from a theory of rational 
choice into a theory of moral choice, which is not intended 
by many of its proponents. It does not seem that one can 
choose one’s ultimate goals using a theory of rational choice.
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